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PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACHES TO WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION
Comparative competition in the water supply sector in the Lao PDR 
K. Burwell, Lao PDR
Water supply is a natural monopoly where options for competition are limited. However, it is possible to compare the 
performance of various operators as a driver for improved levels of service and efficiency. The decentralized urban water 
supply sector in the Lao PDR presents an ideal opportunity for comparative competition to be employed. The Water Supply 
Authority (WASA), the sector regulator, has initiated a comparative competition process whereby the performance of the 18 
state owned enterprises are compared and published. The first performance report of 2002 highlighted many weaknesses 
and indications are that most operators have strived to improve their position for the 2003 report. 
Water Supply – the natural monopoly
It is widely accepted worldwide that the provision of water 
supply services is a natural monopoly with each customer 
limited to only one supplier. Although there have been sev-
eral attempts to expose the sector to competition, e.g. the 
common carriage, inset appointments and competition for 
bulk supplies encouraged by OFWAT1, the industry regula-
tor for England and Wales, the impact on overall efficiency 
and price is limited.
This is not to say that the sector is without competition. 
Even most state-owned operators employ competition for 
the provision of capital works through competitive bidding. 
Competition in operations is harder to achieve. Competition 
for the market, as opposed competition within the market, 
generally through bidding for the right to operate the system 
under management, lease or concession contracts, can ensure 
competitive prices in the short term but do not necessarily 
provide long-term customer benefits. Regulatory interven-
tion is required to ensure that efficiency gains do, in fact, 
trickle down to the consumer as they would if the industry 
was truly competitive. Regulation is therefore a surrogate 
for competition.
Comparative competition – the concept 
The principle problem faced by regulators is to determine 
what levels of efficiency the industry should be striving to 
achieve and how should they be reflected in the regulatory 
outputs, notably the tariffs.
The simplest, but still less than perfect measure of per-
formance is relative performance between operators through 
benchmarking comparisons, a concept known as compara-
tive competition.
The England and Wales model
The Office of Water Services (OFWAT), the industry regulator 
for England and Wales, employs the concept of compara-
tive competition as the cornerstone of its regulatory regime. 
For each activity undertaken by the operators OFWAT sets 
the performance of the best in the industry as the target for 
the rest to follow and applies it to the tariff determination 
process. It is up to the individual operators to outperform 
these expectations to generate returns for their shareholders. 
Failure to meet these expectations results in reduced returns 
(or even losses). The net results in England and Wales are: 
falling tariffs and rising levels of service2. 
OFWAT publishes an annual report on the privatised 
operators illustrating technical, financial and commercial 
performance ranging from compliance with water quality 
obligations through to customer service performance.
Comparative competition for state-owned 
operators
Although the OFWAT comparative competition concept is 
applied with great effect to a privatised industry there is no 
reason why it cannot be applied to a state-owned one. The 
only difference is that the maximisation of profit incentive 
inherent in a privatised structure is not as strong. Further-
more, any failure to meet efficiency expectations determined 
through comparative competition will not result in reduced 
profits for shareholders but will actually deprive the company 
of much needed cash for further investment, which may, in 
turn, lead to lower levels of service.
Notwithstanding the above shortcomings it is still possible 
to generate improved performance through comparative com-
petition, the driver being psychological more than financial, 
1 For further details several guidance papers on these subjects can be found 
on the Ofwat website, www.ofwat.gov.uk.
2 For the first two tariff reviews tariffs actually increased but this was due 
to increased capital investment demands. The operating cost element of the 
tariff has fallen in all tariff reviews since privatisation in 1989.
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i.e. a manager of a water operator will have a desire to be 
amongst the best performing, or at least not to be amongst 
the worst. This is especially strong in Asia where ‘loss of 
face’ is a powerful force.
Constraints and weaknesses
Comparative competition and best value
Comparative competition assumes that all operators are striv-
ing to maximise performance with the result that it improves 
value to customers. It also assumes that value will continue to 
increase as performance increases.  These assumptions may 
not necessarily be true, especially in developing economies 
where the costs of water supply have a significant impact 
on household income. Consequently, if an improved service 
comes at a price this may not necessarily represent improved 
value (see Box 1).
comparisons try to incorporate the size factor to allow more 
realistic comparisons to be made.
Topography may also impact on performance, e.g. an 
operator that has to pump water will carry higher energy 
cost burdens than one where gravity does the job.
Comparative competition in the Lao PDR
First steps
The Water Supply Authority was established in 1999 with 
the dual function of being a channel for capital investment 
and the urban water sector regulator for the Lao PDR, 
comprising 18 provincial Nam Papa state owned enterprises 
(NPSEs). Although this dual responsibility resulted in some 
conflicts of interest it did allow WASA to gain an insight 
into the state of the sector and the problems it faces, largely 
through the feasibility studies and other activities related to 
investment.
The initial comparative competition process comprised 
the collection and analysis of performance data for 12 of the 
18 NPSEs3. The results of the analyses feature in various 
WASA internal reports but were not placed in the public 
domain. It was considered appropriate to first give the NPSEs 
the results and to afford them the opportunity to improve. 
Unfortunately, the quality of the data was insufficient to 
accurately measure performance and improvements, if any, 
were difficult to determine.
In accordance with a loan conditionality imposed by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) the NPSEs were required 
to reduce their arrears to less than 90 days turnover. WASA 
established a monthly reporting system that allowed this 
activity to be monitored very closely. Unfortunately, most 
financial arrears were attributable to government customers 
and only limited improvements were possible.
Notwithstanding the weaknesses in these early attempts 
they did send a clear signal to the operators that WASA was 
going to continue monitoring performance and, in the future, 
the results would be made public. This ‘wake-up call’ to 
the NPSEs had an immediate effect with many operators 
requesting assistance in the form of training and develop-
ment of their human resources, provided by donor funded 
technical assistance projects.
Box 1. Comparative competition and best value 
a hypothetical example
A city with relatively high levels of household income has its 
water services provided by operator A, whereas a smaller town 
with lower levels of household income is served by operator B. 
Operator A has a higher level of service than operator B but the 
customers are willing to pay more for services to be improved. 
Operator A has yet to achieve ‘best value’ (defined as the best 
service possible that customers are willing to pay for).
Although the customers of operator B are not getting the best 
possible service they are not willing to pay more for it to be 
improved and are happy with the current price to service ratio. 
Consequently, operator B is nearly providing ‘best value’.
Consequently, although operator B is actually performing worse 
than operator A on a comparative performance basis it is, in 
fact, closer to delivering ‘best value’. Comparative competition 
has to be treated with care in this instance. 
Where possible benchmark indicators need to be designed 
that reflect performance relative to value. In many cases this 
is relatively simple to determine, e.g. cost efficiency almost 
always moves towards better value. Other indicators such as 
level of service may not reflect value, e.g. customers may 
prefer a less reliable system if improved reliability means a 
higher tariff (see Box 2).
Individual operator characteristics
The individual characteristics of each operator will have a 
bearing on its performance that may invalidate or dilute any 
direct comparisons.
The most prominent factor is the size of the operator 
whereby larger operators enjoy greater economy scale 
benefits than their smaller rivals. It is preferred that any 
Box 2. Case study – Best value
In their asset management plan submissions to OFWAT for the 
1999 price review, the water companies included the costs of 
increased security of supply on the basis that this was in line 
with consumer expectations, i.e. additional capital investment 
to ensure against disruptions to supply in extreme dry weather 
conditions. These plans had obvious adverse tariff implications. 
OFWAT, however, challenged the water companies’ assumption 
and undertook its own market research that discovered that 
consumers would prefer a lower tariff rather than a reduced 
risk of supply disruption.
3 The 12 chosen for analysis were those due to benefit from a major Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) funded capital investment programme
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The 2002 Annual Water Sector Performance 
Report
Having given the NPSEs reasonable opportunity to improve 
their performances WASA signifi cantly raised the stakes in 
comparative competition with the production of the 2002 
Annual Water Sector Performance Report.
Towards the end of 2002 WASA presented all 18 NPSEs 
with simple technical and fi nancial reporting requirements for 
submission to WASA by the end of the fi rst quarter of 2003. 
These submissions were analysed and presented in the report 
as graphs, tables and supporting text. Publication involved 
1000 copies in Lao for national distribution and 500 copies 
in English for international distribution (diplomatic missions, 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies etc.)
The report was also an opportunity for WASA to make 
itself known and incorporated several sections describing 
WASA, its functions and objectives.
Technical performance
The technical analysis compared the performances of all 18 
NPSEs illustrating:
• level of service (hour service per day against service 
coverage as a percentage of the total population)
• staffi ng effi ciency (see Figure 1 below)
• sales performance (water sold per connection per day)
• water loss performance (water lost per connection per 
day)
Where possible, the economy of scale factor was accommo-
dated by applying linear regression techniques to determine 
the average performance relative to the size of the operator 
(see Figure 1). For example, with respect to staffi ng effi ciency 
Vientiane Prefecture, by far the largest of the NPSEs, has 
room to improve to reach average expectations.
It was not possible to factor in other atypical factors in 
this instance although future annual reports will attempt to 
redress this.
A signifi cant omission from the report is water quality 
performance. This is due to the almost complete lack of and 
effective water quality monitoring programme. WASA has 
proposed draft regulations setting out future water quality 
monitoring requirements and once established this will be 
a major performance indicator for future reports. 
Financial performance
The data for the fi nancial reports comprised the statutory 
accounts that all state owned enterprises are required to 
Figure 1. Staffi ng effi ciency
Source: Annual Water Sector Performance Report (2002), WASA, Lao PDR
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submit. These included the profi t and loss statements and 
the balance sheets.
At the time of the report preparation there was no es-
tablished regulatory accounting system and the statutory 
accounts had to suffi ce.
Where possible these accounts were adjusted to remove 
non-core activities and other anomalies to allow effective 
comparisons to be made. The report outputs included:
• Financial performance (see Figure 2)
• Tariffs (implied average determined by turnover divided 
by sales volumes).
Two NPSEs failed to submit fi nancial data in time for 
publication. One of them, after having been publicly rebuked 
within the report, was one of the fi rst to submit data for 
the 2003 Annual Report. The psychology of comparative 
competition obviously worked in this instance.
The poor state of the accounts receivable is, in most cases, 
attributable to non-payment by government customers. 
The report stated this fact and as a result it has prompted 
Government to meet its payment obligations, a signifi cant 
benefi cial side effect.
 The report concludes with the publication of all 16 (2 
not submitted) adjusted profi t and loss statements and bal-
ance sheets.
 
The 2003 Annual Water Sector Performance 
Report
The 2003 report was a signifi cant improvement on the 2002 
report through more detail and improved reporting mecha-
nisms. In addition to the comparison of operator performance 
between each other this report had the added advantage of 
measuring improvements made since the previous report.
Technical performance
The 2002 report appears to have made a signifi cant and im-
mediate impact on operator performance with most NPSEs 
reporting signifi cant improvements in effi ciency (see Figure 
3). It is expected that operators will continue to be motivated 
to improve performance still further.
An additional indicator was service coverage improvement 
(measured by the percentage increase in the number of con-
nections). It is hoped that this will prompt operators to expand 
their services in the future, especially to the urban poor.
Unfortunately, water loss performance did not improve4. It 
suspected that the complexity of the problem may be too great 
to expect improvements in the short term although further 
investigation is required to reach any fi rm conclusion.
Financial performance
The fi nancial reporting for the 2003 report was a signifi cant 
improvement on the 2002 report, attributable to the adoption 
of regulatory accounting standards that facilitated a realistic 
analysis of the operators’ fi nancial positions. The regulatory 
accounts re-determined depreciation and asset valuations on 
a ‘current cost accounting’ basis, thereby eliminating the 
signifi cant distortions created by the periods of high infl ation 
experienced in the Lao PDR in recent years.
The regulatory accounts allowed WASA to examine profi t-
ability (measured as returns of capital), capital intensiveness 
(depreciation as a percentage of depreciation plus operating 
costs), unit cost analysis, gearing (debt as a percentage of 
total capital) and tariff requirements for full cost recovery.
All but four reported negative returns on capital (of these 
four the returns for two of them were so small as to be 
considered negligible) and the activities were extremely 
capital-intensive with depreciation accounting for up 65% 
of total operating costs.
The unit operating costs and tariff analysis (see Figure 4) 
indicated a general uniformity of costs with the larger NPSEs 
enjoying the benefi ts of economies of scale. For most NPSEs 
the required tariff for full cost recovery and a modest 2% 
return on capital was in the range of 16 000 to 26 000 kip/m3 
(approximately 0.15 – 0.25 USD/m3). However, several NPS-
ESs require signifi cantly higher tariffs to recover costs and 
it is recognised at this early stage in the regulatory process 
that external fi nancial support may be necessary.
Figure 2. Financial performance.
Source: Annual Water Sector Performance Report (2002), 
WASA, Lao PDR 
4 Losses actually increased from 260 to 270 litres per connection per 
day.
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Accounts receivable, generally attributable to non-payment 
by government agencies, has, in fact worsened, highlighting 
the need for central government intervention to ensure that 
their local agencies meet their obligations.
The full fi nancial statements in the 2003 report included 
not only the statutory accounts but the adjusted regulatory 
accounts illustrating the dire circumstances of these com-
panies. Hopefully this may prompt further improvements 
from the operators and generate support from government 
to ensure a more fi nancially sustainable future. 
Future comparative competition for the 
Lao PDR
The future for comparative competition in the Lao PDR 
presents many opportunities.
WASA has also prepared detailed regulatory reporting 
requirements for future planning, e.g. sales forecasts, ef-
fi ciency expectations and the like. This will allow WASA 
to monitor actual performance against expectations. It 
is the intention that these projections will form the base 
data for tariff determinations. Over time it is expected that 
WASA will set tariffs not according to the expectations of 
the NPSEs but rather based upon the performances of the 
more effi cient operators.
Lessons learned
Although comparative competition is a useful method to 
encourage greater effi ciency it is not without its problems. 
Individual characteristics of each NPSE weaken direct com-
parisons, especially when comparing large operators with 
smaller ones. It is possible to reduce these impacts through 
Figure 3. Staffi ng effi ciency
Source: Annual Water Sector Performance Report (2003), WASA, Lao PDR
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statistical adjustments but even then the comparisons may 
still be less than perfect.
Simple benchmarking does not capture the concept of ‘best 
value’, and cannot compare how close each operator is to 
achieving best value. A more rigorous analysis that tries to 
measure value is needed but it is unlikely that WASA will have 
the resources to go down this route in the near future.
Notwithstanding the above concerns comparative com-
petition has proved to be a successful driver for improved 
performance by the NPSEs. Further improvements are 
expected with continued and more detailed comparative 
competition.
Figure 4. Financial performance
(10 500 kip = 1.00 USD)
Source: Annual Water Sector Performance Report (2003), 
WASA, Lao PDR  
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